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ABSTRACT 
 
ARTHUR GIBB, III: Arms for Reforms: The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Assistance at 
Encouraging Human Rights Reforms 
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi) 
 
 The United States provides billions of dollars in military assistance to foreign 
governments each year. Military assistance is intended primarily to improve the stability and 
security of strategic partners, but a stated purpose of these programs is also to influence the 
domestic policies of the recipient governments with respect to human rights. Given the 
importance of a modern military force to regimes, especially in the developing world, these 
large grants and loans should give U.S. policy makers significant leverage to force 
improvements in human rights practices by repressive regimes. However, an analysis of 
military aid and human rights records since 1976 reveals that the use and effectiveness of this 
leverage is mitigated by higher strategic priorities dictated by the structural dynamics of the 
international system, particularly the Cold War and the Global War on Terror. 
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Introduction 
 
 Is American military aid to developing countries an effective means of improving  
respect for human rights? While critics of military aid might scoff at the question, it is an 
important one given that encouraging political liberalization is one of the stated objectives of 
U.S. security assistance policy. In fact, proponents of military aid argue that the training 
provided to foreign militaries is effective at spreading American values and ideals, and that 
the provision of arms and equipment provides leverage over domestic policies. Critics, on the 
other hand, have charged that military aid supports oppressive regimes and undermines 
efforts at liberalizing reform, and studies have found mixed results when looking at whether 
human rights are an important consideration for determining who receives U.S. military aid. 
Yet little has been done empirically to determine the effectiveness of military aid in inducing 
reforms in this particular area of domestic policy. 
 
Literature review 
Foreign aid, both military and economic, is seen as an important policy tool by 
American legislators and policy makers. Aid is routinely used to support an array of foreign 
policy goals, not the least of which is encouraging  liberalizing political reforms in the 
recipient state. Whether it is effective at doing so, however, remains unclear. Proponents of 
aid’s effect on political development argue that technical assistance helps to develop the 
political institutions and institutional capacity that are vital to good governance, and aid 
flows have been shown to have a positive and significant, albeit substantively small, effect on 
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levels of democracy and the institutionalization of rule of law (Goldsmith 2001; Knack 2004; 
Busse and Groning 2009). Aid can also be a powerful incentive for reform, and conditioning 
aid on political liberalization and human rights has increasingly become the norm since the 
mid-1990s. The “MCC effect” can already be seen in the efforts of governments to meet 
Millennium Challenge Corporation conditions for inclusion in that program  (Siegle 2007; 
Knack 2004; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007). Unlike conditions of “tied aid” that benefit 
the donor country and undermine aid effectiveness, conditioning aid on performance 
indicators related to good governance can help overcome the principal-agent problem that 
has plagued development aid in the past (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007). Aid flows to less 
developed countries (LDCs) in transition can also provide societal benefits that give the new 
government the breathing room it needs while reforms take hold, and have been shown to 
cause a substantial increase in the rate of democratization in transitioning countries (Finkel, 
Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007; Siegle 2007).  Lastly, aid can facilitate the diffusion of 
democratic ideals through direct personal contact and technical assistance in establishing 
institutions (Goldsmith 2001). 
 Aid critics, however, counter that aid is actually detrimental to democratization and 
institutional development, and so, by extension, to improved human rights practices. One 
popular argument likens aid to the “resource curse” that seems to befall many LDCs that are 
rich in natural resources like oil, diamonds, or minerals. Proponents of this argument believe 
that the windfall of aid dollars relieves the government of the burden of collecting revenue 
from its people, thereby making the government less accountable to the people and less likely 
to provide public services ( Harford and Klein 2005; Collier 2006; Djankov, Montalvo, and 
Reynal-querol 2006; Radelet 2006; Rajan and Subramanian 2007; Moyo 2009). It also 
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encourages rent-seeking behavior, patronage, and corruption, which undermine the 
institutions that do exist and inhibit the development of new ones designed to create 
transparency and accountability. These incentives cause those in power to try to limit access 
to decision making, rather than expand it, which usually means further centralization of 
power in the executive and undermining of institutional checks and balances (Djankov et al. 
2006). A number of quantitative studies support this argument, finding a positive correlation 
between aid levels and decreasing levels of democracy and governance (Djankov, Montalvo, 
and Reynal-Querol 2008; Busse and Gröning 2009). A second criticism is that aid 
conditionality is ineffective because it presents donors with a “Samaritan’s dilemma,” putting 
responsibility for the poor’s suffering on the donor who withdraws aid from a regime that 
refuses to reform. This also creates a moral hazard problem, in that the regime does not bear 
the full cost of failing to enact reforms (Goldsmith 2001; Harford and Klein 2005; Radelet 
2006). Lastly, in another parallel to the resource curse, aid and the potential it represents for 
corruption and patronage can provide a powerful incentive for conflict over control of the 
government, which inevitably results in widespread civilian casualties and human rights 
abuses (Harford and Klein 2005; Moyo 2009). 
If there is little solid evidence that aid in general is effective at creating the liberal 
reforms that would encourage institutional development and improved human rights policies, 
what would cause policy makers to think that military aid could provide the leverage to do 
so?  Security assistance represents a substantial portion of the overall U.S. aid budget, 
ranging from 20% to 60% in the years since 1946, and comprising about half in the aggregate 
(Clarke, O'Connor, and Ellis 1997, 11). In the mid-1970s, concern over human rights abuses 
committed by Latin American governments that were receiving significant amounts of 
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military aid prompted Congress to enact legislation requiring the president to certify that 
military aid recipients were complying with international norms of human rights protections. 
Given the large contribution military aid can make to the total aid package a country 
receives, its human rights conditionality should make it a strong influence on reforms. Yet, 
despite the congressional mandates, a large body of literature from the 1970s and 1980s 
found that human rights abuses were routinely ignored by U.S. policymakers when 
distributing military aid (as well as development aid), and in fact some studies found military 
aid to be correlated with higher levels of abuse ( Fitch 1979; Berrigan, Hartung, and Heffel 
2005; Hartung and Berrigan 2005).  Critics have charged that, rather than supporting 
institutional development and influencing governments to improve their policies, military aid 
has instead facilitated and enabled oppressive governments to commit widespread human 
rights abuses, particularly in Latin America.  
However, a number of (mostly) more recent studies have found substantial evidence 
to counter the worst criticisms of military aid. Several studies have found no significant 
relationship between U.S. military aid and militarism or coups in Latin America (Baines 
1972; Gibler and Ruby 2010), and others have found that human rights records made a 
significant difference in the 1970s and 1980s with respect to who received military aid. 
These studies found that human rights abuses play a positive and significant “gatekeeper” 
role for both military and development aid (Poe 1991; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Poe and 
Meernik 1995; Neumayer 2003; Gomez 2007). Human rights abuses have played a 
significant role in the decision to deny aid to repressive governments in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Bolivia, for example (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985). However, the studies reached 
varying conclusions with regard to the effect of human rights abuses on determining levels of 
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aid to those countries who passed the gatekeeper stage. Both Neumayer and Gomez looked at 
economic aid, and determined that levels of aid were unrelated to human rights abuses. 
Apodaca and Stohl looked at both Official Development Assistance (ODA) and military aid, 
and found that while human rights abuses had no effect on military aid once it started flowing 
to a regime, levels of ODA were affected by human rights policies. A related study also 
found that human rights played a gatekeeper role for military aid while being unrelated to 
levels, but found the inverse relationship existed for ODA – human rights did not appear to 
affect who got economic aid, but significantly affected levels of aid to recipients (Cingranelli 
and Pasquarello 1985). 
These results raise an interesting puzzle. Why might human rights performance affect 
decisions regarding military and non-military aid differently? Decisions to allocate economic 
aid regardless of human rights abuses are likely related to need – denying aid to some 
countries on account of a repressive regime might do more harm than good to the poor and 
hungry. Military aid, on the other hand, does not suffer from this “Samaritan’s dilemma,” and 
so can be more effectively used in a carrot and stick role. However, since there is little 
evidence that levels of military aid are affected by human rights abuses, U.S. policymakers 
appear to use military aid as a carrot only in those cases where a country is of lesser strategic 
importance, and to refrain altogether from using it as a stick against those regimes that are 
receiving it. 
 
Theory 
 The idea that military aid might be somehow related to human rights reforms is 
predicated on two important assumptions. The first is that human rights are in fact important 
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to American policymakers, and that encouraging reforms is an important objective of U.S. 
foreign policy. This is unquestionably a valid assumption, but it is also true that the 
protection of human rights abroad is only one of many important U.S. policy objectives, and 
the encouragement of reforms must often be balanced against other priorities. All foreign aid 
is governed by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and its numerous amendments. A 1974 
amendment introduced language calling for the reduction or termination of security 
assistance, of which military aid is a substantial part, “to any government which engages in a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights (Library of Congress 1974).” This 
language was strengthened in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 to prohibit security 
assistance to such countries, and similar language has been included in all subsequent foreign 
and security aid legislation (Clarke et al. 1997). However, these clauses have always been 
accompanied by language providing exceptions for extraordinary circumstances or the 
national interest of the United States, providing the executive with significant flexibility to 
distribute military aid to regimes regardless of their human rights practices. Although human 
rights play a prominent role in most, if not all, foreign policy statements and speeches, the 
reality is that they must be balanced with other policy goals that are frequently in conflict 
with liberalizing reforms, which can cause instability and unrest in the short and medium 
term (Van De Walle 2002; Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2009).                                      
 The second assumption is that military aid should provide U.S. policy makers with an 
effective lever with which to influence domestic and international policies of recipient states. 
This assumption underlay the use of military assistance as a primary tool of the policy of 
Containment during the Cold War, and continues to be an important justification for military 
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aid today (Mott 2002). There are two mechanisms by which U.S. military aid might influence 
domestic policies on human rights in recipient countries, one direct, the other indirect.  
The indirect mechanism is the diffusion of liberal ideals and values to recipients of 
U.S training under International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. A stated 
objective of these programs is to “increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries 
participating in such [military education and training] activities of basic issues involving 
internationally recognized human rights (Cope 1995, 6).”  This is especially true of the 
Professional Military Education (PME) program. Foreign mid- and senior-grade officers 
attending PME participate in an eight-week immersion course at American military staff 
colleges, during which time they live in American communities and work side by side with 
American officers. In addition to training on tactical and strategic military doctrine, 
participants are exposed by direct contact and by course content to American institutions and 
values, with an emphasis on the institutionalized respect for human rights in American 
society.  
Under PME and other IMET programs, English language courses integrate human 
rights-related documents into course material and foster greater respect for the rule of law 
and civil authority. In 1991, the IMET program was expanded to include non-military 
government officials and increased the focus on military justice and human rights in both the 
in-residence programs and in the curricula utilized by mobile training and education teams 
that conduct one- to three-week courses in the host countries (Cope 1995). Close and 
sustained training of Colombia’s military in recent years has resulted in a visible emphasis on 
human rights in Colombia’s operational planning and indigenous training programs (Porch 
and Muller 2008). 
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Most military leaders and policy makers are convinced that the emphasis on human 
rights in these programs leaves a strong impression on the foreign students when they return 
to their home country. Since participants in the PME program are, almost by definition, 
front-running, career officers, the exposure to American values regarding human rights has 
the potential to alter military and regime policies as these personnel advance to the highest 
levels of their government (Clarke et al. 1997). Evidence of this is difficult to come by, of 
course. Still, program supporters and participants alike acknowledge that a related channel 
for influence is the establishment of personal connections that grant U.S. personnel access to 
and improved communications with senior leaders in recipient countries (Cope 1995; Clarke 
et al. 1997). These channels can allow for continuing reinforcement of American ideals over 
time and provide resources and support for foreign officers in the future. 
A more direct mechanism for leverage provided by military aid is its importance to 
the recipient regime. Regimes in LDCs are generally concerned both about their internal 
stability and their security from external attack or incursion. Since their military is often used 
to ensure both internal and external security, the regime’s longevity is directly related to the 
capacity of its military forces to control violent opposition and insurgencies within the 
country’s borders. Latin American regimes throughout the 1970s and 1980s were highly 
dependent on the support of their militaries, as are many African regimes today. As a result, 
keeping the armed forces well trained and equipped is generally seen as a high priority. 
 A number of studies have shown that one of the most consistent predictors of conflict 
is the proximity of conflict in neighboring countries (Most and Starr 1980; Enterline 1998; 
Gleditsch 2007; Kathman 2008). Having a capable and well-equipped military helps a regime 
to insulate its borders from conflicts that might otherwise spill over. Being able to effectively 
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control one’s territory means being able to deny its use to insurgent or criminal groups from 
neighboring country who would otherwise seek safety in the ungoverned spaces. Exercising 
effective territorial control also discourages domestic populations with ethnic or political ties 
to neighboring countries from trying to secede, and a strong military acts as a deterrent to 
potentially expansionist neighbors (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Forsberg 2008; Gent 2008). 
In LDCs with resource wealth, the prevalence of criminal gangs, piracy and organized crime 
raises the stakes for control of sovereign territory and increases the importance of a capable 
military. 
 Another aspect of military aid that makes it important to the recipient government is 
its fungibility. Since military aid can be a substantial portion of a country’s aid package, it 
represents a significant windfall to the government and can allow for a substantial budget 
redistribution to other, non-military programs. This fungibility is admittedly a double-edged 
sword, because it can also facilitate corruption and rent-seeking behavior or be channeled to 
the private sector (Khilji and Zampelli 1994). Counter-intuitively, however, this can make 
military aid even more desirable to autocratic regimes, and therefore increase the leverage 
that it provides the U.S. to try to encourage human rights reforms. Depending on the regime, 
the cost-benefit calculation may weigh in favor of complying with some human rights 
conditions in order to retain access to the personal enrichment and patronage facilitated by 
the fungibility of military aid. 
 American military aid is particularly desirable because of the superior quality of the 
equipment, training, and support packages that come with it (James and Imai 1996). 
Recipient countries are often willing to accept American conditions because they prefer 
American training and equipment to that they could receive elsewhere. Alternative sources, 
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particularly China and Russia, tend also to offer less in the form of aid. Arms exports and the 
training and support that come with them are an important source of revenue for these 
countries and they are less able to offer the kind of grants available from the United States 
(Klare and Anderson 1996; Kurlantzick, Shinn, and Pei 2006; Weitz 2007; Hanson 2008). 
Military aid from the U.S. also facilitates interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces, a 
factor which can be of substantial importance, especially to countries in Eastern Europe. 
Military aid may be seen as implying a degree of alignment with the U.S., which, while not a 
formal alliance, can carry with it a certain prestige as well as an implied security benefit.  
  Congress appropriates all foreign aid on an annual basis, so recipients who want to 
keep the flow of military aid have a strong incentive to remain in Congress’ good graces by 
complying with the legislative human rights conditions. Congressional decisions to cut off 
military aid to Guatemala, Chile, and Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s were driven by 
public outcry over human rights abuses in those countries, and reflect the willingness of 
Congress to use military aid as a stick in some circumstances (Clarke et al. 1997). Given the 
gatekeeper role that human rights practices appear to play, military aid should also be a 
significant incentive for regimes in need of military aid to demonstrate a commitment to 
reform in order to get off of the Congressional bad-boy list and begin receiving aid. Although 
the studies cited above seem to indicate that Congress and policy makers do not react to 
minor changes in human rights practices by adjusting levels of military aid, anecdotal 
evidence also makes it clear that they are willing to shut it off entirely if abuses are severe 
enough to arouse public or Congressional ire. The threat of total denial of military aid to 
regimes that have become dependent on it should provide the U.S. with a powerful lever over 
domestic policies in the recipient state. This lever should actually increase with the supply of 
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U.S.-manufactured equipment, since the spare parts and support that are included in military 
aid packages are critical to maintain and operate them. Denial of military aid in such cases 
means that capabilities will deteriorate rapidly without a supply of replacement parts and 
technical assistance. 
 Military aid would appear, then, to be an extremely effective tool of U.S. foreign 
policy in terms of its ability to elicit domestic policy concessions from recipient 
governments. Yet the continued use of repression by numerous regimes that receive or 
received significant U.S. military aid – for example El Salvador, Honduras, and Iran in the 
1970s and 1980s, Pakistan, and Indonesia more recently – poses  a serious challenge to this 
assumption. What might be undermining the effectiveness of military aid at achieving a 
broad range of policy goals? Two possibilities exist. The first is that human rights are not 
really important to American foreign policy makers and so encouraging reforms abroad is not 
a true objective of U.S. policy, regardless of public statements to the contrary. This seems an 
unreasonable assumption given America’s long history of promoting human rights and the 
integration of human rights training in all aspects of foreign military training. Furthermore, 
the evidence of the gatekeeper role played by human rights is an undeniable indicator that, 
under some circumstances, human rights is a determining factor for receipt of U.S. military 
aid. 
 The second possibility more effectively explains the inconsistencies in U.S. military 
aid distribution and the apparent lack of influence it commands over some recipients. The 
simple fact is that while human rights promotion is an important foreign policy objective for 
the U.S., it is often subordinated to higher priorities of strategic or national interest. This 
should come as no surprise – realist and neorealist scholars have long maintained that 
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countries act primarily in their own national self-interest  (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Keohane 
1984;Walt 1987; Mearsheimer 1990). More recent scholarship has stressed the importance of 
domestic politics and normative concerns on international relations, but even adherents to 
these schools of thought would acknowledge that these would rarely trump national security 
concerns.  
Unfortunately, human rights reforms can often work counter to more strategic 
objectives. During the Cold War, U.S. fears of the spread of Communism and Soviet 
influence trumped other concerns. Military aid was used to strengthen and prop up regimes 
that were threatened internally by insurgency or that offered a counterweight to Soviet 
influence in other states in the region. In many cases, liberalizing reforms could have 
emboldened Communist opposition, potentially destabilizing the regime. Alternatively, 
withholding aid based on human rights abuses would have weakened friendly regimes and 
U.S. regional influence, neither of which were acceptable in the Cold War context. This 
would help explain why military aid to Kenya and Somalia in the 1980s, designed to counter 
growing Soviet influence in Ethiopia and Angola, was distributed generously despite 
increasingly poor human rights records (Clarke et al. 1997). This explanation is reinforced by 
the precipitous drop in military aid to Kenya and denial of military aid to Somalia after 1989; 
absent the Cold War dynamic, human rights abuses may have weighed much more heavily in 
the decision to grant military aid to these two countries (USAID 2009). The aforementioned 
denial of aid to several Latin American countries in the 1980s offers further support for this 
theory. Although the U.S. was actively supporting counter-insurgency efforts in El Salvador 
and Honduras, generally speaking the Communist threat was significantly less in the Western 
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Hemisphere, and so policy makers were willing to prioritize human rights over other 
concerns. 
 The dynamic of the Cold War could also undermine the effectiveness of military aid 
as a foreign policy tool by creating a reverse leverage that empowered the recipient state. 
Mott argues that the imperative of the ideological competition between the superpowers 
created a reverse leverage that allowed the recipient states to manipulate U.S. fears of 
“losing” states in a zero-sum game with the Soviet Union, ensuring a steady supply of U.S. 
arms and assistance while ignoring conditions placed on them. The ambivalence of many 
states to the grand ideological rivalry meant they were willing to seek military aid from 
alternate suppliers, including the Soviet Union (McKinlay and Mughan 1984; Mott 2002). 
The U.S. believed that any such defection would not only increase Soviet influence, but 
would be interpreted in Moscow and elsewhere as a sign of weakness that would encourage 
greater assertiveness by the Soviets and undermine confidence in America’s ability to 
counter it. Since defection was unacceptable, the U.S. was easily manipulated to support 
almost any state with military aid, and could only bluster about the importance of secondary 
concerns like domestic policies of the recipient regime. In LDCs where the U.S. and Soviet 
Union competed for influence, significant increases in trade or arms transfers were effective 
at swaying the foreign policy alignment of the state toward the provider of trade or arms, 
which would have nullified any efforts by the U.S. to extract concessions with regard to 
human rights (James and Imai 1996). 
 This same structural dynamic might also exist outside of the Cold War context. The 
importance to the United States of peace in the Middle East, both for the survival of Israel 
and the security of the flow of oil from the region, has provided both Egypt and Israel, the 
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two largest recipients of U.S. military aid (prior to 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq), with a similar reverse leverage, while Saudi Arabia and Jordan have also received a 
steady flow of military aid despite widespread concerns about their human rights practices. 
The current imperative of the Global War on Terror has caused the reversal of a number of 
long-standing denial-of-aid policies. Despite questionable or even demonstrably bad human 
rights policies, countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan have 
received large increases in military aid since the terror attacks of 9/11 (Stohl 2003; USAID 
2009). Pakistan is the most glaring example of a country that has used this reverse leverage 
to demand more and more military assistance from the U.S. in the name of a mutual struggle 
against terrorism and radicalism, while continuing to employ repressive techniques against 
domestic opposition forces and consistently ignoring American calls for liberal reforms 
(Amnesty International 2010). In fact, Pakistan may reflect an extreme manipulation of 
reverse leverage, one in which the recipient country takes advantage of the overriding 
strategic imperative to increase its oppression of domestic opposition, knowing that the U.S. 
will be constrained from criticizing its actions. Ironically, under new President Asif Zadari, 
the administration has in fact appeared to be committed to human rights reforms, but the 
military has repeatedly undermined those attempts (Human Rights Watch 2010). 
 Given the existential threats perceived by the United States during the Cold War and 
in the aftermath of 9/11, it is perhaps not surprising that human rights are often subordinated 
to issues of national security, or that recipient countries who recognize these conflicting 
priorities can use them to their advantage. However, if human rights do, in fact, matter to 
U.S. policy makers, then, in the absence of such overriding strategic priorities, we should be 
able to see evidence of the leverage provided by military aid being used to improve human 
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rights. If the effectiveness of military aid is predominantly influenced by structural dynamics, 
then we ought to perceive some variance in the level of effectiveness over time as the 
international structure changes. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Higher levels of U.S. military aid will result in improvements in human 
rights practices by recipient regimes only in the absence of an overriding strategic 
threat to the U.S.  
 
Testing this hypothesis will be the intent of the model described in the next section. 
 
The Model 
Dependent variable: To capture the effect of military aid on human rights policies in 
recipient countries, I will use two well-known measures of human rights. One is the Political 
Terror Scale (PTS), which takes the average of U.S. State Department and Amnesty 
International annual human rights scores for countries around the world (Wood and Gibney 
2009). PTS scores range from one, for countries governed by an established rule of law and 
in which human rights abuses are extremely rare, to five, for countries in which violence and 
terror perpetuated by the government extends to the entire population. For ease of 
interpretation, I invert the PTS scale so that lower scores represent greater levels of abuse, 
and five represents an institutionalized respect for human rights. The second is the CIRI 
Human Rights Dataset, from which I use the Physical Integrity Rights Index. This index 
scores countries from 0 to 8 based on an additive measure of four indicators from the larger 
dataset – torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. A score of 
zero indicates a complete lack of respect for those rights; eight indicates an institutionalized 
respect for those rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2008). Both of these metrics capture the 
extent to which “personal integrity rights” are respected, as opposed to a broader measure of 
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“civil rights” (Gomez 2007). Because violation of personal integrity rights will almost 
always involve the military, this measure is more likely to show the effect of military aid on 
government-directed coercive practices through both the direct and indirect mechanisms 
discussed above. Indexes of human rights that include broader measures such as civil rights 
and an independent judiciary would tend to be affected more by levels of political and 
institutional development and less by the narrow influence of military aid. 
 
Independent variable: The independent variable MILAID is derived from the U.S. Agency 
for International Development’s (USAID) annual publication U.S. Overseas Loans and 
Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, commonly referred to as the “Greenbook.” 
The Greenbook details annual military aid to all recipient countries. Because theory tells us 
that military aid will create a dependency, its effectiveness as a lever over domestic policy 
will not appear immediately, but rather should become manifest over a period of a few years. 
For this reason, I use a moving average of military aid, in millions of U.S. dollars, in the five 
years preceding the year for each recorded PTS and CIRI score. I then take the natural log of 
this average in order to smooth out the dramatic differences in aid received by a few 
recipients – Israel, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan particularly.1 Military aid refers specifically 
to a number of programs that provide military training and equipment, either directly or 
through loans and grants to purchase them, but does not include Foreign Military Sales or 
Commercial Direct Sales, programs through which American military equipment is sold to 
foreign governments. The military aid figure used here is the aggregate of funds allocated for 
                                               
1 Because the levels of aid received by these countries are orders of magnitude larger than all other recipients, 
robustness checks were conducted by removing them from the dataset altogether. The results were substantively 
unchanged. 
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Foreign Military Finance, IMET, Military  Assistance Program, counter-narcotics, anti-terror, 
peacekeeping, and transfers from excess stock (also called Excess Defense Articles). 
Three controlling variables will be used to account for possible alternative 
explanations of human rights behavior: 
Regime type: A substantial body of literature has demonstrated that democracies generally 
have better human rights records than non-democracies, so a measure of regime type needs to 
be included to account for this (Mitchell and McCormack 1988; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; 
Reiter 2001; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Milner, Leblang, and Poe 2004). I code the 
variable REGIME using scores from the POLITY IV dataset to measure the democratic or 
non-democratic nature of the regime. The POLITY IV dataset scores regimes on a 21-point 
scale, from -21 for most autocratic, to 21 for most democratic. Higher POLITY scores should 
correlate with  better human rights scores.  
 
Level of development: Findings in the literature regarding the effects of economic 
development on human rights are more conflicted than those on democracy. A number of 
studies support the theory that higher economic growth is accompanied by greater political 
and institutional development that results in greater respect for human rights (Poe, Tate, and 
Keith 1999; Milner, Leblang, and Poe 2004; Doorenspleet 2005; Abouharb and Cingranelli 
2006). However, conflicting studies find that economic growth can strengthen autocratic 
regimes and increase levels of repression against publics demanding a greater piece of the 
economic pie (Gupta, Madhavan, and Blee 1998; Bueno De Mesquita and Downs 2005). 
Other studies find a mixed effect, with economic growth having a lagged positive effect on 
long-term human rights protections, but a negative effect in the short and medium run (Feng 
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1997; Tang 2008), or differing effects on personal integrity rights than on civil liberties 
(Richards et al. 2001). A measure of GDP per capita (GDPCAP) is commonly used as a 
proxy for development and will be taken from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators. The natural log of GDP per capita is used to smooth out the results. 
 
War: The presence of civil or interstate war generally precipitates greater human rights 
abuse. A dichotomous variable WAR for the presence of conflict will be derived from the 
Correlates of War dataset, with a 1 for a year in which a country was involved in civil or 
interstate war, and a 0 otherwise. 
 
The dataset contains observations from 197 countries. Since the focus of the study is 
on improving human rights practices in developing nations, I dropped OECD countries with 
PTS scores that averaged 2 or less ( 4 or more in the transposed data) or CIRI scores that 
averaged 6 or higher for the years the data was available. Of the 30 OECD countries, this left 
only Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey in the dataset, and a total of 170 countries. The unit 
of observation is the country-year, of which there were 5380 observations. 
A time series cross-sectional regression was used to test the above hypothesis using 
these variables. The basic model is 
    HR = ß0 + ß1MILAID +  ß2REGIME + ß3GDPCAP + ß4WAR +  µ                  (1) 
I use a fixed-effects model to correct for bias introduced by unit effects in pooled time series 
data. The model will be run using both PTS and CIRI human rights scores, and will be run 
for five time periods: 1981-2008 (Model 1); the Cold War years 1981-1989 (Model 2); the 
post-Cold War years 1990-2008 (Model 3); the post-9/11 years 2002-2007 (Model 4); and 
the interim years 1990-2001 (model 5). This will enable a test of the effect of different 
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structural conditions on military aid effectiveness as well as the effectiveness itself. Four 
possible results can be anticipated: 
1. A positive and significant relationship across time between military aid and human 
rights practices in the recipient country, demonstrating the effectiveness of military 
aid at influencing domestic human rights policy. 
2. A negative and/or insignificant relationship that changes to positive and significant 
over time (or vice versa) will provide evidence of structural effects and reverse 
leverage. 
3. A negative and significant relationship across time will provide evidence that human 
rights are not important to the U.S., and/or that military aid facilitates oppressive 
regimes. 
4. An insignificant relationship, regardless of time period will be an indication that 
military aid is ineffective at achieving human rights-related goals, or that human 
rights are not enough of a priority for the U.S. to use military aid leverage. 
Results 
 The results of the regressions are shown in Tables 1 and 2, and the summary statistics 
in Table 3. Three characteristics of the results are interestingly consistent across all models. 
First, military aid had a negative effect on both measures of human rights across all time 
periods. Second, for all time periods except the post-9/11 years, military aid had a 
statistically significant result on both measures of human rights (or very nearly so in the case 
of the PTS score in Model 3). Third, in all models, the effect on the CIRI score reached a 
higher level of statistical significance than the effect on the PTS score. 
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In the baseline and Cold War models, military aid had a negative and statistically 
significant effect on both measures of human rights. Comparing the results of these two 
models, the negative effect on both CIRI and PTS scores appears greater during the Cold 
War years (-.041 and -.013, respectively) than it was over the entire four-decade period        
(-.018 and -.005). This is not surprising, since the overriding strategic context of the Cold 
War could be expected to trump human rights concerns during this period, and the U.S. 
provided extensive military aid both to regimes involved in conflict and to autocratic regimes 
which aligned with the West. The results of these two models support the contention of our 
Model 1: Baseline Model 2: Cold War Model 3: Post-Cold War Model 4: Post-9/11 Model 5: 1990s
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
U.S. military aid -0.018 0.007 *** -0.041 0.015 *** -0.019 0.008 ** -0.022 0.016 -0.040 0.011 ***
Regime 0.037 0.007 *** 0.069 0.016 *** 0.086 0.010 *** 0.105 0.022 *** 0.071 0.013 ***
GDP per cap (log) -0.157 0.074 ** -0.211 0.239 -0.136 0.088 -0.660 0.119 *** 0.366 0.167 **
War -1.713 0.110 *** -0.937 0.248 *** -1.112 0.124 *** -0.883 0.176 *** -0.889 0.165 ***
_cons 5.587 0.521 *** 6.101 1.607 *** 5.162 0.630 *** 8.907 0.870 *** 1.601 1.164
R-sq:
   within 0.095 0.057 0.082 0.096 0.063
   between 0.289 0.118 0.200 0.002 0.262
   overall 0.181 0.108 0.152 0.000 0.213
Countries 129 92 129 128 125
Obs 2771 776 1995 866 1253
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
U.S. military aid data from USAID 2009 publication U.S. Overseas Laons and Grants:Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1945-2008.
Table 1: Pooled Time Series Analysis of the Effect of U.S. Military Aid on CIRI Physical Integrity Index
(1976-2007)
Model 1: Baseline Model 2: Cold War Model 3: Post-Cold War Model 4: Post-9/11 Model 5: 1990s
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
U.S. military aid -0.005 0.003 * -0.013 0.006 ** -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.007 -0.015 0.005 ***
Regime 0.009 0.003 *** 0.030 0.007 *** 0.025 0.004 *** 0.050 0.010 *** 0.023 0.005 ***
GDP per cap (log) -0.020 0.031 -0.108 0.103 0.008 0.036 -0.149 0.054 *** 0.383 0.068 **
War -0.932 0.048 *** -0.667 0.108 *** -0.685 0.053 *** -0.338 0.080 *** -0.612 0.067 ***
_cons 3.468 0.220 *** 4.179 0.693 *** 3.161 0.258 *** 4.157 0.397 *** 0.571 0.468
R-sq:
   within 0.128 0.082 0.101 0.067 0.114
   between 0.448 0.255 0.427 0.005 0.290
   overall 0.274 0.199 0.283 0.014 0.227
Countries 128 96 128 127 124
Obs 2848 796 2052 866 1309
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
U.S. military aid data from USAID 2009 publication U.S. Overseas Laons and Grants:Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1945-2008.
Table 2: Pooled Time Series Analysis of the Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Terror Scale Index
(1976-2007)
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hypothesis that structural conditions affect the ability or willingness of the U.S. to use 
military aid to influence domestic policy. 
It might be inferred from the comparison of Models 1 and 2 that the effect during the 
post-Cold War years was positive, resulting in a smaller negative effect overall. However, the 
results from Model 3 indicate that the negative effect continued even after the Cold War. In 
fact, the coefficients for both the CIRI and PTS scores in Model 3, -.019 and -.006, 
respectively, match very closely those of the baseline model. The CIRI coefficient is 
significant at better than the .05 level, and the PTS coefficient barely fails to meet the .1 level 
of significance. Although the coefficients in Models 1 and 3 are roughly half the size of those 
in Model 2, the consistent negative effect indicates that human rights remained subordinate to 
other considerations even in a less competitive post-Cold War environment. 
 
 
The results from Model 4 indicate that the greater strategic priorities of fighting a 
global war on terror may indeed have trumped human rights concerns, as they did during the 
Cold War, but these results failed to reach normally accepted levels of statistical significance. 
Given the statistical significance in all other models, the lack of statistical significance in 
Model 4 is likely attributable to the shorter time period for which data was available. 
The most surprising results come from Model 5. During the 1990s, when military aid 
was predicted to have been most effective at inducing human rights reforms, the effect is 
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CIRI 1533 4.314 2.28 0.00 8.00
PTS 1769 3.345 1.16 1.00 5.00
U.S. military aid 1738 -4.810 6.05 -13.82 7.95
Regime 1686 7.057 1.24 4.38 10.21
GDP per cap (log) 1609 0.946 6.65 -10.00 10.00
War 2016 0.109 0.31 0.00 1.00
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nearly indistinguishable from that during the Cold War. The coefficients on both human 
rights measures are nearly identical to those in Model 2, and both are statistically significant 
at greater than the .01 level. Given the congressional mandate that military aid both support 
and reward human rights reforms, it is somewhat shocking to find a negative relationship 
between the two during a period which was seen as a new age of liberalism and democratic 
freedoms. This result appears to reject our hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of military 
aid as a lever over recipient governments’ domestic policies. The absence of any overarching 
strategic threat to the U.S. and the instability facing new and transitioning regimes worldwide 
should have made American military aid an extremely effective tool for inducing liberal 
reforms during this decade, and yet it appears to have been correlated with human rights 
abuses by recipient governments at the same level that it was during the Cold War.  
 With respect to the control variables, the coefficient for regime type was in the 
predicted direction and statistically significant at better than the .01 level in all models, 
reflecting the well-established tendency for more democratic regimes to demonstrate more 
respect for human rights. The coefficient for war was also highly statistically significant and 
in the predicted negative direction.  
 The effect of GDP per capita was somewhat mixed. For the baseline model, it had a 
negative and statistically significant effect on the CIRI score. Its effect on the PTS score was 
also negative, but it did not approach traditional levels of significance. It was also negative in 
five out of six cases in Models 2, 3, and 4, but only reached an accepted level of statistical 
significance in the years following 9/11, during which it was negative on both measures. 
Model 5, however, indicates that GDP per capita was positively related to human rights 
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performance during the 1990s, and was statistically significant at better than the .05 level on 
both the CIRI and the PTS scores.  
One possible explanation for the mixed results is the exclusion of the OECD 
countries, all of which have high per capita GDP and high human rights scores. However, 
running all models again, this time with the OECD countries, made no significant difference 
in the results. These results mirror the divergent results found elsewhere in the literature on 
the relationship between development and human rights. 
 
Conclusions 
 This study began from the premises that human rights practices of foreign 
governments matter to U.S. policy makers, and that American military aid was of sufficient 
importance to recipient governments to provide the U.S. with leverage to influence domestic 
policies related to human rights. However, it is generally understood that strategic 
imperatives will trump human rights and other values-related foreign policy objectives when 
they come in conflict, and the U.S. has often been criticized for its military support of 
repressive regimes and its failure to pressure those regimes for liberal reforms. This study 
attempted to determine whether the U.S. does, in effect, put its money where its mouth is 
with regards to human rights promotion, and whether military aid is an effective tool to use 
to that end. If so, then sustained military aid should be correlated with improvements in 
recipient regimes’ human rights performance. Although this effect could be expected to be 
overshadowed by greater strategic priorities, such as during the Cold War or the post-9/11 
Global War on Terror, it should have been observable in the interim years when the U.S. 
enjoyed an unusual political, economic, and military hegemony.  
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 The findings of the study, however, are disappointing for those who are seeking 
evidence of American policy makers’ commitment to the promotion of human rights. Across 
all time periods evaluated, except for the years following 9/11, military aid demonstrated a 
consistent and statistically significant negative effect on human rights in recipient countries. 
While the smaller negative effect of military aid on human rights after 1989 compared to the 
Cold War years lends some support to our hypothesis and the greater importance of human 
rights outside of a competitive structural dynamic, the lack of a positive relationship even in 
the 1990s indicates either that military aid is an ineffective tool to influence human rights 
policy, or that policy makers do not use it as such even at times when it should be effective. 
There are at least three possible inferences to be drawn from the statistical results.  
The first is that U.S. military aid actually encourages human rights abuses by recipient 
regimes. During the Cold War, this can be understood in the context of American support for 
regimes fighting communist or socialist insurgencies, regimes whose abusive practices were 
overlooked by the U.S. in light of the policy of Containment and fear of the spread of 
communism. The negative results in the post-Cold War era are troubling, however. Given the 
emphasis placed on human rights practices by both the legislation governing military aid and 
the military aid programs themselves, the fact that recipients of military aid still appear to get 
worse rather than better after receiving American equipment and training provides strong 
ammunition for critics of military aid.  
The second implication is that military aid is simply an ineffective tool for 
influencing domestic policies. Weak or fledgling regimes trying to consolidate power or 
stabilize internal turmoil may be unwilling to adopt more humane policies that might 
strengthen the opposition, regardless of U.S. desires. Regimes that have a tighter grip on 
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power and security, possibly because of their repressive policies, may be in a stronger 
bargaining position with the U.S., seeing American military aid as a desirable good but not a 
necessity. Policy makers and the military leadership may justify continued American support 
of both types of regimes by a strong belief in the normative effect of exposure to American 
values through military training programs and in the increased possibility of influencing 
domestic policies through sustained interaction and trust-building. They may also be 
supported in their judgment by anecdotal evidence of the positive normative effects of 
military cooperation and assistance, despite the apparent inability of military aid to effect 
positive systemic change. 
Finally, these results provide strong confirmatory evidence of the subordination of 
human rights to other foreign policy objectives. Not only does military aid not respond to 
changes in human rights behavior, as demonstrated elsewhere in the literature, but these 
results imply that policy makers are not inclined to use whatever leverage military aid might 
convey. The consistent negative effect across time demonstrates that human rights concerns 
are superseded not only by strategic imperatives like the Cold War, but also by other political 
concerns. These might include the influence of domestic political interests, commercial 
priorities, or other objectives not addressed by this study. This also means that existing 
legislative requirements for compliance with international human rights norms, while used to 
justify denial of military aid when there are no greater competing priorities, are ineffective at 
restricting military aid to oppressive regimes once they have passed the gatekeeper phase. If 
human rights concerns are not important enough to deny aid in the first place, they will 
receive no more than token attention from policymakers when considering continued 
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provision of aid, and recipient regimes will recognize that they face no penalty for continuing 
repressive policies.  
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